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Shame and the Ethical in Williams 
Abstract: ​Bernard Williams’ ​Shame and Necessity (1993) was an influential                   
early contribution to what has become a broader movement to rehabilitate                     
shame as a moral emotion. But there is a tension in Williams’ discussion                         
that presents an under-appreciated difficulty for efforts to rehabilitate                 
shame. The tension arises between what Williams takes shame in its                     
essence to ​be and what shame can ​do​—the role that shame can be expected                           
to play in ethical life. Williams can—and we argue, should—be read as                       
avoiding the difficulties stemming from this tension, but this requires a                     
reevaluation of several of his central claims about shame’s role in ethical                       
thought and experience. For instance, his broad claims that the “​structures                     
of shame” can “give a conception of one’s ethical identity​” (93), and that                         
shame “mediates … between ethical demands and the rest of life” (102),                       
cannot be taken at face value. What emerges is a view that is in a sense less                                 
ambitious, but also more in tune with the spirit of Williams’ larger project.                         
There may also, we suggest, be a more general lesson: We should be                         
suspicious of the temptation to seek some special affinity between shame                     
and ethical life, lest we distort our understanding of both. 
1 Introduction 
“There must,” insists Bernard Williams in ​Shame and Necessity​, “be options for                       
ethical thought and experience that the Kantian construction conceals” (1993: 77).                     1
In seeking to elaborate one of these options, Williams famously develops and                       
draws upon a conception of shame and shame culture that is informed by his                           
understanding of the ancient Greeks.  
Shame possesses at least two important features for Williams. First, shame and                       
our susceptibility to shame are relatively basic and are not essentially ethical in                         
character; they are thus prior to our ethical thought and experience. This means                         
that shame can provide some explanatory purchase by grounding ethical thought                     
and experience in more basic concerns and attitudes relating to our motivations,                       
characters, identities, and social relations. Shame, in other words, offers a way to                         
naturalize, humanize and demystify the ethical. Relatedly, according to Williams,                   
the structures and propensities of shame make possible a demystification of the                       
ethical that is accurate rather than distorting. Williams’ development of this                     
second point has made ​Shame and Necessity an influential early contribution to                       
what has become a broader movement to rehabilitate shame as an ethical emotion.  2
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all parenthetical references henceforth are to ​Shame and Necessity                         
(1993). 
2 ​Other contributions to this effort include Gabriele Taylor ​(1985)​, Sarah Buss ​(1999)​; David                         
Velleman ​(2001)​; Cheshire Calhoun ​(2004)​; Michelle Mason ​(2010)​; Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele                       
Rodogno & Fabrice Teroni ​(2012)​; and Krista K. Thomason ​(2018)​. 
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However, despite the undeniable depth and subtlety of Williams’s treatment,                   
there is a tension between the features of shame just identified. The more basic                           
shame is, and the more free of any ​essential connection to the ethical, the harder it                               
is to see how shame could be specially suited to shed light on the nature of the                                 
ethical in the way that Williams envisions. Conversely, the better suited shame is                         
to shed such light, the less plausible it becomes that shame (so conceived) is basic                             
or free of any essential connection to the ethical in the way required for the desired                               
demystification to succeed. 
This tension is not addressed in ​Shame and Necessity​, and has not been well                           
appreciated since. ​Williams can—and we argue, should—be read as avoiding the                     
difficulties stemming from this tension, but this requires a reinterpretation of                     
several of his central claims in ​Shame and Necessity ​about shame’s role in ethical                           
thought and experience. For instance, his broad claims that the “​structures of                       
shame” can “give a conception of one’s ethical identity​” (93), and that shame                         
“mediates ... between ethical demands and the rest of life” (102), cannot be taken at                             
face value. What emerges is a view that is in a sense less ambitious, but also more in                                   
tune with the spirit of Williams’ larger body of work. ​Moreover, and more                         3
generally, this reevaluation of Williams’ views serves as an illustration of the                       
dangers of asking too much of shame: ‘rehabilitating’ shame by seeking a ​special                         
connection between shame and ethical life risks distorting our understanding of                     
both.   4
Williams’ extended treatment of shame was groundbreaking, and contributed                 
to a burgeoning theoretical interest in this emotion. Yet more recent work on                         5
shame often treats Williams’ discussion as a useful source of isolated, quotable                       
insights, rather than engaging with his account in depth. At the same time, shame                           6
often retreats into the background in work on Williams’ broader ethical views,                       
where it tends to appear, if at all, only through its connection to other topics like                               
moral luck or reasons internalism. For these reasons, Williams’ rich exploration of                       
shame is ripe for a thorough examination. 
We first lay out Williams’ larger ethical project in ​Shame and Necessity​, and his                           
conception of shame and its role in ethical life (§§2-4). We then identify the                           
tension between what ​Williams takes shame to ​be and what shame can ​do​, and                           
explore four different ways that Williams can be read to avoid the difficulties                         
stemming from this tension before settling on our preferred interpretation (§5). We                       
3 Hence, readers sympathetic to Williams’ larger project might need little encouragement to                         
interpret ​Shame and Necessity’s ​claims about shame’s role less ambitiously. However, key passages in                           
Shame and Necessity lend themselves to a more ambitious interpretation, and as we will see, this                               
interpretation is prominent in more general discussions of shame. 
4 Here we can only suggest this as a broader lesson (in §6); we offer a more extended argument for it                                         
in “Asking Too Much of Shame” (in progress). 
5 See, e.g., the works cited in footnote 2. 
6 An essential and notable exception, to which we are indebted, is Calhoun ​(2004)​, though a                               
significant disagreement with Calhoun’s interpretation is raised in §5. 
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conclude with some brief observations about the project of rehabilitating shame as                       
a moral emotion (§6). 
2 Shame in Williams’ Ethical Project 
Williams seeks to show that Greek thought, especially that of Homer and the                         
tragedians, contains resources that can help us to better understand ourselves and                       
our ethical situation. In particular, Williams is concerned, in ​Shame and Necessity                       
and elsewhere, to resist a specific set of assumptions about our modern ethical                         
outlook, which sometimes finds expression in the idea that that the Greeks lacked                         
a distinctively ​moral ​outlook, or a conception of ​moral ​agency, of a kind that we                             
possess (4-8). In this way, ​Shame and Necessity builds upon and elaborates Williams’                         
other critical writings concerning what he called “the morality system."  7
The set of assumptions that Williams resists is mostly closely associated with                       
the work of Immanuel Kant. Among other things, Williams rejects the Kantian                       
ideas that practical injunctions come in essentially two basic kinds, categorical and                       
hypothetical, and that morality is a distinct sphere that is concerned solely with                         
categorical imperatives. He sees these ideas as concealing a broad and important                       8
dimension of ethical life that is reflected, for instance, in Ajax’s resolution that he                           
must end his own life, or Oedipus’ insistence that he ​must learn the truth (75).                             
These injunctions are not categorical in the Kantian sense—they are grounded in                       
the agents’ specific characters, commitments, and situations. Yet they are not                     
merely hypothetical, in the sense of being relative to a desire that the agent merely                             
happens to have. They are, rather, ​necessities that are ethical in some broader sense.                           
This sets Williams off on his search for “options for ethical thought and                         
experience that the Kantian construction conceals” (77). 
Williams thus uses ‘ethical’ to designate a dimension of our lives that is                         
broader than the realm of categorical injunctions that is the stuff of morality on the                             
Kantian conception. But he means at the same time to pick out something                         
narrower than practical reason in general, or simply what matters or is important to                           
us. ​Shame and Necessity ​is, he explains, “directed to what I call, broadly, ethical                           
ideas of the Greeks: in particular, ideas of responsible action, justice, and the                         
motivations that lead people to do things that are admired and respected” (4). This                           
is in line with Williams’ characterizations of the ethical throughout his works, as                         
for instance in ​Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy​: 
However vague it may initially be, we have a conception of the ethical                         
that understandably relates to us and our actions the demands, needs,                     
claims, desires, and, generally, the lives of other people, and it is helpful                         
7 See, for instance, ​Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy​ (1985), especially chapter 10. 
8 Williams’ criticisms of the Kantian conception of morality are more fully developed in ​Ethics and                               
the Limits of Philosophy​ (1985), particularly chapter 4. 
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to preserve this conception in what we are prepared to call an ethical                         
consideration (1985: 12).  9
This is also consistent with the commonsense notion of the ethical, according to                         
which matters of responsibility, justice, honesty, and the like are properly                     
described as ethical, whereas certain other values and aspirations—beauty,                 
renown, athletic excellence—are not. The same contrast is again indicated when                     
Williams asserts, for instance, that “[t]he question ‘what should I do?’ and its                         
answer … are not necessarily or peculiarly ethical; ​ethical considerations are ​one                       
kind of input into the deliberation” (1985: 127; our emphasis). Hence, Williams                       
insists that there are pursuits and dispositions—such as “creative and cultural”                     
ones (1985: 46)—that are valuable without being ethical. 
Williams aims in ​Shame and Necessity to develop a conception of ethical                       
thought and experience, in the sense just indicated. ​But having rejected the                       10
Kantian-influenced conception of moral obligation, he requires a different                 
understanding of the apparently distinctive force of the sort of injunction that                       
confronted Ajax and Oedipus. His twofold aspiration is an understanding that                     
will, first, ground the force of these injunctions in a realistic and intelligible way in                             
our lived experience (rather than, for instance, appealing as the Kantian system                       
does to a ​sui generis and ultimately inscrutable notion of obligation; second, it will                           
do justice to the conviction that these injunctions are ​ethical in a recognizable                         
sense. In developing such an understanding, Williams seizes upon shame as a key                         
concept. 
The reasons for this choice are never directly stated, but they emerge over the                           
course of Williams’ discussion. First, the ancient Greeks—particularly the Homeric                   
Greeks—are often described as inhabiting a shame culture, in contrast to our own                         
guilt culture (5, 78, 88-89). In developing this distinction, Williams presents the                       
differences between shame and guilt as a key to understanding Greek ethical                       
thought in relation to the modern alternative that he wants to resist. In particular,                           11
he suggests that guilt contrasts unfavorably with shame in being more convoluted,                       
less transparent, and more apt to be moralized—and indeed warped—by its close                       
association with the morality system (88-95, 219-223). 
Guilt’s association with the morality system contrasts with shame’s relative                   
independence. Thus Williams’ approach to understanding shame can be helpfully                   
illuminated by contrasting it with a central theme in the Western tradition of                         
philosophical moral psychology reaching back to Plato, which Williams repeatedly                   
criticises. Plato is said to have invented 
9 Cf. ​Truth and Truthfulness​ (2002: 24). 
10 He later wrote: “In my book ​Shame and Necessity … I tried to reach an understanding of certain                                     
ideas in the Homeric poems, in particular ethical ideas such as agency, responsibility, shame, and                             
constraint” (2006: 64). 
11 Williams also draws on this contrast between guilt and shame in his “Shame, Guilt, and the                                 
Structure of Punishment” (1997: 26-29). 
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the idea that the basic theory of action itself, the account of what                         
human beings are and how they do anything, is a theory that must be                           
expressed in ethical terms. … The idea is … that the functions of the                           
mind, above all with regard to action, are defined in terms of categories                         
that get their significance from ethics. This is an idea that is certainly                         
lacking in Homer and the tragedians (42). 
Accordingly, Plato’s tripartite soul is designed to organize conflicts between                   
different internal impulses so as to assign the impulses that he saw as rational and                             
good, and those that he saw as irrational and bad, to different psychic organs. A                             12
distant but direct descendant in this line of moralized psychology is Kant’s idea of a                             
“will” distinct from mere desire or inclination, that “serves in the interest of only                           
one kind of motive, the motives of morality” (41). 
Throughout his philosophical career Williams was fundamentally opposed to                 
this moralizing tendency. ​Truth and Truthfulness​, for instance, finds him returning                     13
again to advocate a “project of ethical naturalism” that consists in “explaining the                         
ethical in terms of an account of human beings which is to the greatest possible                             
extent prior to ideas of the ethical” (2002: 26-27). And in ​Shame and Necessity he                             14
urges, as an antidote to the moralizing tendency in theorizing about psychology, a                         
return to Homeric conceptions of agency and action. Homer, he contends, had                       
“the basic items that we need, and he lacked several things that we do not need, in                                 
particular the illusion that the basic powers of the mind are inherently constituted                         
in terms of an ethical order” (46). Prominent among the things that Homer did                           
have, of course, is the idea of shame that is central to Homeric shame culture. 
Finally, shame presents itself to Williams as a promising point of focus because                         
shame, as he conceives of it, has a structure that connects it naturally to the ethical                               
as a category. He understands the ethical, we have seen, as centrally concerning the                           
relation between “us and our actions,” on the one hand, and, on the other, “the                             
demands, needs, claims, desires, and, generally, the lives of other people,”                     
including “the motivations that lead people to do things that are admired and                         
respected” and the capacities that enable people “to shape their behaviour in some                         
degree to social expectations.” And shame is for Williams (as we will see in more                             
detail in §4) precisely the emotion that is most directly involved in relating our                           
characters and identities to the attitudes and reactions of other people. 
In ​sum​, Williams’ interest in, and admiration for, Homer and the Greek                       
tragedians, his mistrust of the modern “morality system,” his relational                   
12 Here, we are not arguing that Williams was correct in attributing to Plato a moralized psychology.                                 
One might argue that Plato’s ethical treatment of psychological drives comes only after they have                             
been characterized in independent terms. Thanks to Sophie Grace Chappell for this point. 
13 As the example of Plato illustrates, the moralizing tendency to which Williams objects includes                             
not only efforts to characterize the functions of the mind in terms of the “morality system”                               
associated with Kant, but also efforts to characterize them in  moral or ethical terms more generally. 
14 Although naturalism is not a key concept in ​Shame and Necessity​, Williams’ commitment to                             
naturalism is a consistent theme in his work. See ​Truth and Truthfulness (2002: 22-27) and                             
“Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” (1995: especially 67-69). 
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understanding of the ethical, and his commitment to naturalism, all converge on                       
the focal concept of shame. The following two sections sketch how shame is put to                             
work in Williams’ project of developing his conception of ethical thought and                       
experience that seeks to be at once realistic and faithful to our intuitive notion of                             
the ethical. 
3 A Realistic View of Shame 
Williams opens his discussion of the nature of shame, in chapter 4 of ​Shame and                             
Necessity​, by observing that “[t]he basic experience connected with shame is that of                         
being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition” (78). But                         
of course, if Williams is to avoid the moralizing error that he attributes to Plato and                               
others, the terms “inappropriately” and “wrong” cannot be understood in a ​moral                       
or ethical sense. And this is borne out in the more detailed discussion of shame in                               
his first Endnote, “Mechanisms of Shame and Guilt”. There Williams clarifies that                       
“[t]he root of shame lies in exposure in a more general sense, in being at a                               
disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general phrase, a loss of power. The                               
sense of shame is a reaction of the subject to the consciousness of this loss” (220).  
This “loss of power” conception represents shame in very basic, non-moralized                     
terms, while providing sufficient flexibility to accommodate a wide range of shame                       
phenomena within a unified account. Thus the “elementary situation of actually                     
being seen naked” can provoke shame because, and to the extent that, being seen                           
naked is experienced as a “powerful expression” of a disparity of power. That is,                           
under specified circumstances, “the loss of power is itself constituted by actually                       
being seen” (220). In other cases, the loss of power does not consist merely in being                               
seen, but in having some behavior, feature, or circumstance revealed to another                       
person in a way that puts the subject at a felt disadvantage. Consistent with this                             
account, the revealed feature need not itself be of ​moral significance: As Williams                         
notes, “we, like the Greeks, can be as mortified or disgraced by a failure in prowess                               
or cunning as by a failure of generosity or loyalty” (92). Hence, his account of                             
shame does not betray the moralizing tendency.  
Moreover, the aspect of the agent that is revealed to the other need not itself be                               
judged negatively either by the other or by the agent herself. This Williams                         
illustrates through the case of an artist’s model who has been posing for a painter                             
for some time, but only comes to feel shame when she realizes that the artist sees                               
her not primarily as a model but rather in a sexual light (220-221). Here the model                               15
may find no fault in her appearance or conduct—after all, prior to realizing the                           
artist’s attitude she experienced no shame. Similarly, the artist may see the model                         
only in a positive light. The model’s shame, then, may consist instead in the way                             16
15 This example is originally Max Scheler’s and is also discussed by Taylor (1985: 60-61), among                               
others. 
16 Williams comments that ​he may even “think that she is privileged to have aroused his lust” (222).                                   
Of course, this thought may be more likely to arise in a society, like ours, where women are sexually                                     
objectified. Hence, the positive light in which she is seen by the artist might reflect an ideal of                                   
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in which the artist’s revealed attitude puts her at a felt disadvantage: “the change in                             
the situation introduces the relevant kind of unprotectedness or loss of power ...                         
She had previously been clothed in her role as a model; that has been taken from                               
her, and she is left truly exposed, to a desiring eye” (221).  17
The flexibility of Williams’ basic account of shame also accommodates a                     
further category of shame experiences that Williams does not discuss, but which                       
has become an important focus in some more recent discussions of shame. (We                         
also return to these cases when we explain the tension that we see in Williams’                             
views about shame.) These are shame experienced in the face of attitudes with                         
which the subject may not agree. If shame is a matter of power or advantage                             
relative to an audience (rather than, say, direct negative self-assessment) then the                       
subject need not agree with her audience that she is, for instance, ridiculous or                           
contemptible in order to feel shame in the face of their judgment that she is so. A                                 
vivid illustration of this possibility is provided by the shame that members of                         
marginalized or subordinated groups sometimes experience in the face of                   
demeaning attitudes towards themselves that they do not share. If shame is                       18
conceived as a form of self-assessment that does not essentially involve the gaze or                           
appraisal of an other, shame experiences of this type can seem puzzling. But if                           19
shame is understood as a felt recognition of a loss or disparity of power in relation                               
to an audience (in this case, a disparity in the social power attached to group                             
membership), then these cases are rendered intelligible as instances of shame. The                       
ability to accommodate this class of shame experiences can thus be seen as a                           
significant virtue of Williams’ conception of shame.  20
femininity which itself is deleterious to women and puts them at a disadvantage. This would be one                                 
way in which the model could experience this situation as involving a ​loss of power relative to her                                   
audience.  
17 Williams notes that “[w]hat arouses shame ... is something that typically elicits from others                             
contempt or derision or avoidance” (90), but this is only typically the case, not necessarily so, as the                                   
example of the model illustrates. It is typically the case simply because we are more likely to feel at a                                       
disadvantage in the face of a contemptuous attitude than in the face of an admiring one. 
18 To be clear, we refer here not merely to experiences of ​being ​shamed by members of dominant                                   
groups—that is, being the objects of their demeaning attitudes or behavior—but to experiences of                           
feeling shame ​in the face of such attitudes or behavior. Shame experiences of this kind are widely                                 
attested in the testimony of members of marginalized groups, and are increasingly the focus of                             
philosophical attention. Calhoun, for instance, has argued that “people who wholeheartedly                     
condemn sexist or racist insults are still vulnerable to feeling shamed by those insults, and ... this is a                                     
perfectly natural response for a mature, well-formed agent to have” (2004: 137).  See also Maibom                             
(2010: 572) and Velleman (2001: 45). 
19 This family of views is illustrated by John Rawls and R Jay Wallace’s conceptions of shame. For                                   
Rawls, shame arises “from the injury to our self-esteem owing to our not having or failing to                                 
exercise certain excellences” (1971: 444). In a similar vein, Wallace claims that “in feeling shame                             
about an action, one thinks of the action as revealing the lack of an excellence that one values and                                     
aspires to possess; the basic evaluative stance here is that of desiring something as a good” (1994:                                 
240). According to these and similar self-assessment accounts, there is no essential role for the                             
perspective of another person at all. Cf. Kekes 1988: 282. On the controversy concerning the role of                                 
an audience in shame, see Bero (2019). 
20 Hence it may be surprising to find that Williams has been depicted in the shame literature as ​not                                     
being able to accommodate this class of shame experiences. See, for instance, Calhoun (2010:                           
135-137) and Maibom (2010: 574-5). We return to this point in §5. 
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The addition of another psychological mechanism allows Williams to extend                   
his account of shame further still. He proposes that the other whose gaze is an                             
essential element in shame need not be an actual other, but may instead be an                             
imagined or internalized figure: “Even if shame and its motivations always involve                       
in some way or other an idea of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of                                     
its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do” (82). The imagined                           
other may be a specific person—for instance, a childhood authority figure                     
(222)—but it need not be; it can instead be a figure who is in various ways                               
abstracted or idealized. In this way, “the imaginary observer can enter very early in                           
the progression towards more generalised social shame” (82). This begins to                     
explain how it is that shame can play an important role even in conduct                           
undertaken outside of anyone else’s view. As discussed in the following section,                       
this feature of shame is crucial to Williams’ effort to understand ethical life in                           
terms of shame. 
4 Ethical Shame 
We have seen that Williams conceives of shame, at the most basic level, in                           
non-moralized terms, as a felt disadvantage or loss of power, relative to another                         
person who stands in the position of a “watcher or witness” (219). A significant                           
virtue of this realistic and flexible conception is that it accommodates a wide range                           
of shame phenomena (reaching beyond the cases specifically mentioned by                   
Williams) in a plausible way. But Williams, while seeking always to avoid the                         21
moralizing tendency that he criticizes, is nonetheless most interested in a particular                       
class of shame experiences that, he argues, are central to ​ethical​ life. 
Here two features of shame are crucial. The first, mentioned at the end of the                             
previous section, is that shame can be experienced before an imagined or                       
internalized other; it does not require an actual person to occupy the role of                           
watcher or witness. The second is that a given person need not be, and ordinarily                             22
is not, equally susceptible to shame before all possible audiences; in this regard,                         
shame can be selective. As he writes elsewhere: “Sometimes you would be ashamed                         
only in the eyes of a particular person (‘I am glad my mother did not live to see                                   
this’); in other cases, you will be ashamed in the eyes of a stranger, or a crowd of                                   
strangers, but not of your old friends or your family” (1997: 28). Similarly, in ​Shame                             
and Necessity he claims that people “need not be ashamed of being poorly viewed, if                             
the view is that of an observer for whom they feel contempt” (82). Rather, under                             
favorable circumstances people may develop shared standards and values—“some                 
kinds of behaviour are admired, others accepted, others despised” (83)—and shame                     
21 To be clear, we do not mean here to endorse or defend Williams’ account of shame. Our aim is                                       
rather to explain it and understand the features that make it plausible and attractive for Williams’                               
purposes. 
22 In contrast, Williams characterizes embarrassment as a “kind of shame which arise[s] either from                             




may come to be attached to the gaze or appraisal of others whose judgments and                             
attitudes the subject respects. It is then versions of ​these others who are                         
internalized, abstracted, and idealized in the course of developing the complex                     
susceptibility to shame that is the mark of a mature member of a shame culture. 
It is the combination of these two features that makes it possible for shame to                             
play an important role in Williams’ conception of ethical life. Through the                       23
process of internalization, shame becomes more than merely a matter of saving                       
face, while the selectivity of shame allows it to become associated with specific                         
values and commitments, including ethical ones. Thus Williams explains that the                     
internalized other before whom more complex and developed versions of shame                     
are felt 
need not be a particular individual or, again, merely the representative                     
of some socially identifiable group​. ​The other may be identified in ethical                       
terms. He ... is conceived as one whose reactions I would respect;                       
equally, he is conceived as someone who would respect those same                     
reactions if they were appropriately directed to him (84, our emphasis). 
This is the pivotal moment in Williams’ deployment of shame, in which shame                         
takes on ​ethical content. Having taken this step, Williams can then draw upon                         
shame’s unique resources and “mechanisms” (103) to develop an understanding of                     
several important features of the ethical.  
We noted earlier that the ethical, as Williams conceives of it, is closely                         
connected to social expectations and shared standards of evaluation. At the same                       
time, the ethical is about much more than merely maintaining an appearance of                         
outward conformity, but is a matter of character and integrity. Williams                     
emphasizes that this was true also for the Homeric Greeks. The ethical thus                         24
bridges the domains of social expectation and inner conviction in a way that can be                             
elusive. Williams proposes that the mechanisms of shame hold the key to                       
23 Some may wonder whether guilt is sufficiently similar to shame in these two respects to serve as                                   
the basis for a similar, and perhaps competing, account of the ethical. Even if guilt were similar in                                   
these respects, however, it would be unsuitable for Williams’ purposes due to other differences                           
mentioned earlier, including that guilt is, in Williams’ view, more convoluted, less transparent, and                           
more apt to be moralized—and indeed warped—by its close association with the morality system.                           
These differences play an important role in Williams’ explanation of the ethical in ​Shame and                             
Necessity​, as they also do in his explanation of the psychological impact of punishment in “Guilt,                               
Shame, and the Structure of Punishment” (1997). Moreover, in the latter paper he indicates that                             
shame differs from guilt in possessing the two features we have identified. For instance, he lists                               
“different dimensions in which shame is indeterminate or variable” even though guilt is not. In                             
particular, he points to the publicity of shame and claims that shame, unlike guilt, “implies the idea                                 
of a spectator of one’s weakness, failure, or bad behaviour” and that it is “essential to shame that                                   
this spectator may be merely imagined, an internalized figure” (1997: 28). We thus interpret                           
Williams as conceiving of shame and guilt in such a way that only shame, and not guilt, is suitable                                     
to play a central role in explaining the ethical. Thanks to András Szigeti for urging us to consider                                   
this. 
24 “Suppose someone invites us to believe that the Homeric Achilles, if assured he could get away                                 
with it, might have crept out at night and helped himself to the treasure that he had refused when it                                       
was offered by the embassy: then he has sadly misunderstood Achilles' character” (81). 
9 
 
understanding this complex relation between inner and outer in ethical thought                     
and experience. 
In the first place, shame becomes more than merely a matter of responding or                           
conforming to others’ expectations when the figure of the audience is internalized                       
in the way just discussed. The trigger for shame is then not the gaze of any social                                 
other whatsoever, but rather the appraisal of a figure whose judgment the subject                         
respects​. The subject can “identify with this figure, and the respect is to that extent                             
self-respect” (103), and acting out of shame, or out of a desire to avoid shame,                             
becomes a matter not merely of prudence, but of integrity.   25
At the same time, however, Williams is at pains to emphasize that even in these                             
circumstances the internalized other does not “merely shrink into a hanger” for the                         
subject’s own ethical values, and thus drop out of the equation. Rather, the other                           
retains its identity as an ​other​: it is “potentially somebody rather than nobody, and                           
somebody other than me” who can “provide the focus of real social expectations,                         
of how I shall live if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions and                                     
reactions will alter my relations to the world about me” (84).  26
In addition to shedding light on the special way in which inner and outer                           
dimensions are united in the ethical, Williams proposes that when the internalized                       
audience comes to be an object of respect and identification, ​then the “structures                         
of shame” can serve to “give a conception of one’s ethical identity” (93) and “of                             
what one is and of how one is related to others” (94; cf. 102, 103). At the same time,                                     
because the internalized figure represents a genuine other who is connected to                       
social expectations and more generally to the subject’s social reality, the process of                         
internalization tends to involve the inculcation of shared standards and values.                     
Williams observes that shame, together with indignation or a sense of honor, are                         
“shared sentiments with similar objects [that] serve to bind people together in a                         
community of feeling” (80). Thus, the structures of shame, are “essentially                     
interactive between people, and they serve to bond as much as to divide” (81). In                             
sum, ​shame can function both as an important source of ethical self-knowledge                       
and as a force that fosters ethical community and shared ethical sensibility. 
25 This is related to what Williams calls the ‘egoism’ charge against shame cultures. If shame involves                                 
being anxious or afraid of being found out or of being seen in a certain way by others, then one                                       
might worry that shame is necessarily egoistic or narcissistic. Williams argues that this worry can be                               
easily refuted by appealing to an ​internalised other since “[i]f everything depended on the fear of                               
discovery, the motivations of shame would not be internalised at all” (81-82). In this paper, we are                                 
not concerned with this charge although much of what Williams says about shame is an attempt, in                                 
part, to disabuse us of the notion that shame is nothing but an egoistic concern for public opinion. 
26 Calhoun questions whether Williams can adequately capture the “distinctively social character of                         
shame” (2004: 134). She worries that by “trac[ing] the power to shame to the shamer’s ​mirroring ​to a                                   
large extent the agent’s own evaluative perspective” (2004: 135), Williams causes the figure of the                             
internalized other to “merely shrink into a hanger” for the subject’s own ethical values, despite his                               
insistence to the contrary. Calhoun concludes that “[t]o attempt to make oneself invulnerable to all                             
shaming criticisms except those that mirror one’s own autonomous judgments or that invoke                         
ethical standards one respects is to refuse to take seriously the social practice of morality.” (2004:                               
145). In this paper, we take no position on the merits of this objection, though we will take issue in                                       
§5 with a different aspect of Calhoun’s reading of Williams.. 
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Return now to the question that launched Williams’ investigation of shame:                     
the distinctive force of practical injunctions of the sort faced by Ajax and                         
Oedipus—injunctions that were left out of account by the Kantian division of                       
categorical versus hypothetical. ​The “mechanisms of shame,” Williams suggests,                 
provide the right kinds of materials to make sense of the special force of these                             
injunctions (103). In an ethically well-developed subject, the force of shame is more                         
than merely hypothetical, because it is connected to standards and to an evaluative                         
perspective that the subject respects and identifies with; at the same time, the force                           
of shame is not categorical, because it is firmly grounded in the particular social                           
context and sensibilities of the subject. As Williams summarizes: “By giving                     
through the emotions a sense of who one is and of what one hopes to be, [shame]                                 
mediates between act, character, and consequence, and also between ethical                   
demands and the rest of life” (102). 
What thus emerges from Williams’ discussion is not only an ambitious                     
alternative conception of our ethical thought and experience in terms of shame,                       
but also an ambitious ethical reclamation of shame itself. As Williams remarks,                       
from the perspective of the modern “morality system,” shame often appears                     
unprincipled, unruly, and generally more likely to disrupt or undermine ethical                     
thought and practice than to support it. “In the scheme of Kantian oppositions,” he                           
observes, “shame is on the bad side of all the lines”—superficial, egoistic, and                         
above all heteronomous, since “I lose face or save it only in the eyes of others”                               
(78-79). Shame’s essentially social orientation may appear to put the subject at the                         
mercy of the evaluative perspectives of others, impairing her ability to exercise her                         
own evaluative judgment and to function as an autonomous agent. But Williams’                       
account redeems shame, suggesting instead that shame can serve as the most                       
authentic and reliable voice of the subject’s autonomous self—a self which is, in                         
his view, inherently socially situated and constituted. The distinctive ethical                   
injunctions of shame are, he concludes, “internal, grounded in the ​ēthos​, the                       
projects, the individual nature of the agent, and in the way he conceives the                           
relation of his life to other people’s” (103). 
5 Our Challenge: Tension in Williams 
There is a tension between the ambitious and central role in our ethical life that                             
Williams attributes to shame and the rudimentary conception of shame as a felt                         
loss of power. In essence, the tension is this: In order to play its assigned role in                                 
Williams’ account, it appears that shame would need to become somehow                     
exclusively, or at least ​distinctively​, connected to the ethical; but in light of the                           
broad scope of shame under the loss-of-power conception, such a special                     
connection seems unrealistic.  
To see this, recall that in Williams’ conception, shame registers the subject’s                       
loss or disparity of power relative to an audience, consisting either of actual other                           
people or of internal figures who may be abstracted and idealized. It is consistent                           
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with this account, and confirmed by the wide range of experiences that are                         
intelligible to us as instances of shame, that various and quite disparate dimensions                         
of power or advantage can serve as the material for shame. In the elementary case                             
of nakedness, it is the simple fact of exposure that is experienced as                         
disadvantageous; in the case of bullying or abuse, the relevant dimension of power                         
may be more concrete, consisting in the brute physical inability to defend or assert                           
oneself. In addition, as Williams argues, in certain cases the relevant dimension of                         
power may itself be moralized, as in the case of a subject who feels shame in the                                 
face of a respected other’s ​moral ​disapproval. These examples illustrate the many                       
different dimensions of power or advantage to which shame can attach itself. 
This range of shame experiences poses a challenge for Williams’ claims that ​the                         
“​structures of shame” can “give a conception of one’s ethical identity​” (93), and                         
that shame “mediates ... between ethical demands and the rest of life” (102). We                           
might ask: Why should shame be expected to give a conception of the subject’s                           
ethical identity, rather than simply a conception of the salient or significant ways in                           
which she is subject, in a wide variety of different dimensions, to the power of                             
various observers? Or similarly, why should shame be expected to mediate between                       
ethical demands and the rest of life, rather than simply between the demands of                           
relative power or position and the rest of life?  
Williams’ account suggests how ethical content can enter into the mechanisms                     
of shame, but it does not suggest that other dimensions of relative power or                           
advantage would be ​excluded or displaced. Nor could it, without sacrificing                     
psychological plausibility. After all, a subject who is liable to shame in the ethical                           
domain can equally be liable to shame in other domains—for instance, relating to                         
bodily privacy, to standards of appearance and attractiveness, to athletic or                     
aesthetic abilities, and so on. Once allowance is made for the basic nature and                           
broad scope of shame, it becomes difficult to see how, for a subject with a normal                               
and familiar range of susceptibilities, shame could help to locate her ​ethical identity                         
in particular, as distinct for example from her other (social) identities, or how it                           
could mediate between ​ethical demands and the rest of life, precisely because her                         
shame will draw much of its material from the rest of life. 
This tension is not irresolvable, and there are resources within Williams’                     
account to resolve it, but this raises an interpretive dilemma: ​Either we can read                           
Williams as claiming a tight relationship between shame and the ethical so that ​all                           
shame experiences are grounded in, and thus reveal, our ethical commitments and                       
identities; ​or we can accept a weakening of the relationship between shame and the                           
ethical, with the result that resources beyond our shame experiences will be                       
required to reveal our ethical identities and lend force to ethical demands.                       
Ultimately, we suggest that the second horn is preferable, but in one sense it does                             
not really matter, because either option will require a significant reassessment of                       
the connection between shame and what we ordinarily understand as the ethical,                       
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revealing several central claims about shame in ​Shame and Necessity to be less                         
ambitious than they may appear. 
Before examining the two horns of the dilemma we briefly consider, and reject,                         
one attempt to escape the dilemma: One might argue that Williams need not                         
accept that the cases of shame we have appealed to are indeed shame experiences,                           
insisting instead that some additional feature must be present for these emotional                       
responses to count as shame. However, this is not open to Williams given his                           27
basic conception of shame: “In contrast to guilt … [a]ll that is necessary [for shame]                             
is that [the observer] should perceive that very situation or characteristic that the                         
subject feels to be an inadequacy, failing, or loss of power” (221). We therefore                           28
proceed on the assumption that the cases upon which we rely must be accepted                           
under Williams’ view as genuine shame experiences. 
5.1 First Horn: Shame as Tightly Connected to the Ethical 
On the first horn of the interpretive dilemma, we read Williams as holding that ​all                             
shame, at least in ethically well-developed subjects, will reveal our ethical                     
identities, impose ethical demands, and so on. ​Readers sympathetic with Williams’                     
broader naturalistic project might be immediately inclined to resist an                   
interpretation of ​Shame and Necessity ​which connects shame so tightly to the                       
ethical. However (as we mentioned in footnote 3), a version of this interpretation is                           
prominent in the shame literature.  
There are two versions of this interpretation available. The first version draws                       
on some additional resources within ​Williams’ discussion. In particular, Williams                   
conceives of ethical shame in terms of an internalized other whose reactions the                         
subject respects, and his claims about shame’s role in ethical life could be                         
understood in relation to this feature. According to this reading, it is shame before                           
a (typically internalized) other whom the subject respects and identifies with that is                         
claimed to give the subject a conception of her ethical identity and to mediate                           
between ethical demands and the rest of life.  29
27 For instance, according to Rawls and Wallace, shame involves a negative self-assessment that one                             
endorses (see footnote 19). The merits of this sort of account are not our topic, but in our view, this                                       
approach risks committing the ‘moralistic fallacy’ identified by D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), which                         
consists in illicitly equating the fittingness of an emotion with its moral appropriateness. That is, we                               
should not collapse the distinction between shame that can be accurately attributed to a subject and                               
shame that we think is appropriate or justifiable for the agent to feel. 
28 Moreover, we suspect that Williams would not want to be forced to draw a sharp distinction                                 
between shame and embarrassment, as he thinks that embarrassment may be a mild variant of                             
shame. (See also his footnote about embarrassment in his (1997: 28) mentioned in our footnote 22.)                               
In the context of claiming some cases of shame “are very near to needing an actual watcher, without                                   
quite doing so”, Williams gives the example of “stumbl[ing] over my shoelaces in the street, trying                               
to recover falling packages, knock[ing] off my own hat”. He claims that he would experience “some                               
mild variant of shame or embarrassment” (221). 
29 On this reading, a further assumption would be required for shame to perform its assigned                               
functions; namely that the mechanisms of this sort of shame are sufficiently transparent to the                             
subject, or that they could be made so through self-examination, such that the subject can clearly                               
distinguish between this sort of shame and other kinds of shame. This assumption is questionable,                             
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Chesire Calhoun’s influential interpretation of Williams follows this line.                 
According to her understanding of his view, “ethically well-developed agents …                     
choose whose standards to respect and thus whose eyes have the power to shame.                           
... They care how they appear because they have a general respect for the other’s                             
evaluative evaluative commitments, skill at moral reasoning, and perceptiveness.                 
That general respect grounds the power to shame” (2004: 133).   30
Calhoun understands this to mean that the ethically well-developed agent will                     
feel shame ​only in the eyes of others whose ethical judgment they respect. This                           
becomes clear, for instance, when she characterizes Williams as rehabilitating                   
shame in the face of the objection that shame is heteronomous and “incompatible                         
with autonomous moral judgement” by “claiming that mature agents ​only feel                     
shame in the eyes of others whose ethical reactions they respect” (2004: 129,                         
emphasis added). This reading has the important advantage of furnishing a                     
compelling justification for Williams’ more ambitious-sounding claims about               
shame’s ethical role. If the ethically well-developed agent only feels shame that is                         
grounded in her respect for others’ ethical judgments, then there is a clear sense in                             
which shame can serve as a source of knowledge of her ethical identity and as a                               
mediator between ethical and other demands.  
This reading, however, carries a steep cost. As Calhoun complains, by                     
grounding our liability to shame in our respect for others, the view that she                           
attributes to Williams has the unfortunate result that “we must discount as                       
irrational or immature much of the shame suffered by socially disesteemed                     
populations—racial minorities, women, the poor, lesbians and gay men” (2004: 135).                     
But this line of objection is somewhat perplexing, in light of our prior argument                           
that it is one of the virtues of Williams’ loss-of-power conception that it can                           
account for precisely the sorts of cases that concern Calhoun. Given Williams’                       
claim that “[t]he other ​may be identified in ethical terms … as one whose reactions I                               
would respect” (84; our emphasis) and given his broad and realistic understanding                       
of the nature and dynamics of shame, it is uncharitable to interpret Williams as                           
claiming that we ​only feel shame in the eyes of those we respect. But we can see                                 
how this distortion results from taking, at face value, some of Williams’ more                         
ambitious-sounding claims about shame’s ethical role, and thereby illustrates the                   
tension that we identify in ​Shame and Necessity​. 
So let us turn to the second version of the interpretation according to which all                             
shame, at least in ethically well-developed subjects, will reveal our ethical                     
identities. In this version of the first horn of the interpretive dilemma, we read                           
Williams as broadening the notion of the ethical so that we can regard all shame                             
before a respected, internalized figure as ‘ethical’ shame, and thus as revealing our                         
as Williams seems to recognize (see his reference to the “ambivalence and possible betrayals of                             
shame” (97)). 
30 Calhoun notes that the others we respect “can shame us with their criticisms [even] when we                                 
disagree with their evaluation of us” (2004: 133). But this is only, on her reading of Williams, because                                   
of the general respect we have for their ethical judgements.   
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ethical identities, imposing ethical demands, and so on. Suppose you are playing an                         
informal basketball game with your colleagues and although you love playing, your                       
abilities leave much to be desired. Being unable to play as well as your colleagues,                             
you feel shame. Suppose that this shame experience reveals nothing other than                       
your desire for a certain level of athletic ability as well as your desire not to look                                 
poorly to your colleagues. On the interpretation we are considering, we                     
nonetheless regard your shame as revealing your ‘ethical’ commitments and your                     
‘ethical’ identity.  
This interpretation would also construe shame experienced by “socially                 
disteemed populations” as revealing their ethical commitments. For instance,                 
suppose that a woman feels shame about her body for failing to meet the dominant,                             
mainstream beauty ideal. According to this interpretation, this shame experience                   
reveals her commitment to the mainstream beauty ideal and the notion of the                         
‘ethical’ is understood so broadly as to count this aesthetic commitment as one of                           
her ‘ethical’ commitments.  31
We note some problems with this second version of the interpretation on                       
which all shame reveals ethical commitments and ethical identities, broadly                   
construed. As an interpretive matter, it seems inconsistent with Williams’                   
characterizations (in ​Shame and Necessity and elsewhere) of the ethical as                     
comprising matters of responsibility, honesty, justice, and the like, in contrast with                       
cultural and personal aspirations and dispositions—concerning fame, beauty,               
etc.—that are valuable, but do not belong to the domain of the ethical.  
Moreover, construing the ethical so broadly that all shame reveals ethical                     
identities drains of all meaning Williams’s own proposal that the internalized other                       
might be “identified in ethical terms” (84) rather than otherwise; according to this                         
interpretation, shame before a respected, internalized other just is ethical shame,                     
regardless of the terms in which the other may be identified.  
In addition, on this reading, Williams’ claims that shame can “give a conception                         
of one’s ethical identity” (93) and “mediate[ ] … between ethical demands and the                           
rest of life” (102) cannot be taken at face value. That is, they cannot be understood                               
as claims about a connection between shame and what we ordinarily understand to                         
be the ethical—they are instead claims relating shame to a much broader and more                           
basic dimension of our characters and social lives. From the point of view of                           
understanding what we ordinarily understand to be the ethical, these claims are                       
thus rendered less ambitious to the point of triviality. What connection there may                         
be between shame and the ethical in particular (understood in the ordinary sense)                         
is, on this reading, simply not addressed in ​Shame and Necessity​. Hence, we should                           
31 Perhaps one’s commitment to the mainstream beauty ideal can be regarded as an ​ethical                             
commitment even when the ethical is construed more narrowly. After all, this aesthetic                         
commitment is plausibly the result of a commitment to patriarchy (even if this commitment is                             
implicit and not endorsed after critical reflection). But even if some commitments to certain                           
aesthetic ideals count as ethical commitments, there will be other clear-cut cases of shame (such as                               
shame that reveals one’s commitment to a certain athletic ideal) that are not ethical in character if                                 
the ethical is to be construed narrowly. 
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not accept this interpretation on which Williams’ most ambitious-sounding claims                   
about shame and the ethical are vindicated, in a sense, by definition, by using a                             
much broader understanding of the ‘ethical.’  
In sum, on this horn of the interpretive dilemma, we considered that all shame,                           
at least in ethically well-developed subjects, will reveal our ethical identities,                     
impose ethical demands, and so on. We examined two different ways of preserving                         
this tight connection between shame and the ethical. The first version claimed                       
that we feel shame only in the eyes of others whose ethical judgment we respect.                             
The second version construed the notion of the ethical so broadly that all shame                           
becomes ‘ethical’ shame. Neither of these are viable interpretations since Williams                     
does not think that the other must be identified in ethical terms. 
5.2 Second Horn: Shame as Contingently Connected to the Ethical 
On the second horn of the interpretive dilemma, we preserve the commonsense                       
notion of the ethical as comprising matters of responsibility, honesty, justice, and                       
the like. But although this notion of the ethical is broader than the notion                           
associated with the morality system, it is not as broad as the operations of shame.                             
On this horn, we deny that all shame experiences reveal our ethical identities;                         
rather we accept that only some shame experiences reveal our ethical identities.                       
Hence, on this horn, there is only a contingent connection between the shame and                           
the ethical.  
There are also two versions of this second horn of our interpretive dilemma.                         
First, we could claim that there is a distinctive kind of shame—called ‘ethical                         
shame’—which is conceived as shame in terms of an internalized other whose                       
reactions the subject respects, and this ethical shame reveals our ethical identities.                       
This version is similar to the first version of the first horn of the interpretive                             
dilemma but does not claim that all shame is ethical shame. Hence, on this reading,                             
we concede that ethically well-developed subjects may be susceptible to other sorts                       
of shame. The proposal here is that such subjects can still derive a conception of                             
their ethical identities, and identify ethical demands, by focusing exclusively on                     
the shame they feel before others whom they respect. 
However, it seems to us that the scope of this type of shame—that is, shame                             
involving a respected other—is still much broader than the ethical. This is because                         
while we are prone to internalize a respected moral authority, we are also prone to                             
internalize respected figures who appraise us according to a wide variety of other                         
standards that are vitally important to us: standards of physical appearance,                     
professional competence, aesthetic taste, athletic prowess, and so on. And this                     
means that even if we focus narrowly on shame before internalized, respected                       
figures, such shame will not be well suited to give us a conception of our ethical                               
identities or mediate between ethical demands and the rest of life, because such                         
shame is liable to—and personal experience attests, very often does—concern itself                     
with much more than just the ethical. 
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An example may help to show that this phenomenon—of shame that is felt                         
before an internalized, respected figure but is ​not ethical in character—is not                       
merely a hypothetical or marginal possibility, but a common and indeed important                       
factor in our social lives. Imagine a healthy, mature, well-socialized agent who has                         
developed a sense of shame in connection with the ethical in the way that Williams                             
describes. So she sometimes feels shame because she fails to meet real social                         
expectations represented by an internalized other, identified in ethical terms,                   
whose reactions she respects. Moreover, she is not typically ashamed of being                       
poorly viewed if the view is that of an observer for whom she feels contempt. 
Now suppose that this healthy, mature, and well-socialized agent is a member                       
of a marginalized group—say, a woman of colour living under dominant ideologies                       
of patriarchy and white supremacy. Under these circumstances significant social                   32
power is attached to gender and race categories, and so, as the loss-of-power                         
conception would predict (and as we have already noted in §3), marginalised                       
people can be made to feel shame in response to demeaning attitudes or even to                             
being stereotyped on the basis of the relevant features. Our agent may thus be                           33
susceptible to shame in connection with ​her body size or shape; with being seen to                             
be ‘too bossy’; or with preferences and choices that might be regarded as connected                           
to her race (for example, imagine that she is a black woman and feels shame when a                                 
colleague remarks that he is not surprised that she likes fried chicken).  34
Finally, suppose that she has internalised some of these oppressive norms and                       
that her attitudes towards them are not—or at least, not entirely—critical; that is,                         
she has come to accept and endorse, at least to some extent—and perhaps                         
implicitly though not explicitly—some sexist and racist standards and attitudes as                     
they apply to herself. The result of this is that she is susceptible to shame in                               
connection with these norms that is grounded in the gaze of an internalized figure                           
whose appraisals she respects and identifies with. Call these shame experiences                     
oppressive shame​.  35
Oppressive shame is not merely a theoretical possibility; it is, sadly, a common                         
and pervasive feature of oppressive ideological systems, and one important                   
mechanism through which those systems are established and maintained. It thus                     
32 Indeed, Sally Haslanger (2012) defends definitions of woman and man as well as what it is to be                                     
racialized in terms of this kind of systematic subordination and privilege. 
33 One might argue that when we focus on mature and well-socialized individuals, we see that they                                 
will be discerning about which other they internalize as an ethical other. Hence, mature agents will                               
be insensitive to the gaze of  those whose attitudes and responses they do not respect and so will not                                     
be susceptible to oppressive shame. But we find this objection problematic because it implies that                             
subjects who experience such shame cannot be fully mature or well-socialized. Without delving                         
more deeply into this issue, in the face of testimony to the contrary by members of marginalized                                 
groups, and in light of widespread recognition of the phenomenon of internalized oppression, this                           
strikes us uncharitable and presumptuous, as well as simply implausible. Cf. Calhoun’s observation                         
quoted above in footnote 18. 
34 For potential sources of the stereotype that black Americans love fried chicken, see Demby (2013). 
35 The phrase “oppressive shame” is used by Aness Webster (unpublished). Heidi Maibom (2010)                           
uses the phrase “persecution shame”, but to the extent that persecution is narrower than                           
oppression, we have opted for “oppressive shame”.  
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makes concrete the tension between Williams’ basic conception of shame and the                       
role of shame in illuminating the ethical. For our imagined agent, even focusing                         
solely on shame involving a respected, internalized figure cannot provide a                     
conception of her ethical identity or mediate between ethical demands and the rest                         
of life, because she has (at least) two such figures: one representing the ethical and                             
one representing the norms of the oppressive ideologies to which she is subject.  36
We have identified a particular type of shame—oppressive shame—which is                   
not ethical in character and does not reveal ethical identities even though it is                           
conceived in terms of an internalized other whose reactions the subject respects.                       
This shows that we cannot establish a tight connection between shame conceived                       
in terms of an internalized and respected other and the ethical. Hence, we are left                             
with a weaker version of the interpretation according to which shame only plays a                           
contingent role in revealing our ethical identities. In this second version of the                         
interpretation, shame can, and often does, become attached to a broader range of                         
social standards and expectations, only some of which belong to the domain of the                           
ethical. This has the advantage of preserving a narrower and more commonsensical                       
notion of the ethical that is consistent with the way Williams generally                       
understands and uses the notion. Moreover, it allows us to say that oppressive                         
shame, for instance, need ​not​ reveal ​ethical​ commitments and identities.  
The tension that we identified requires reconciling Williams’ conception of                   
what shame is and the seemingly ambitious role that he assigns to shame in ethical                             
life. The proposal here (and our preferred one) is to resolve this tension by                           
reinterpreting several of Williams’ claims about shame’s role in ethical life in a less                           
ambitious way, weakening the connection between shame and the ethical and                     
recognizing that significant resources other than shame will be required in order                       
fully to understand the relevant features of ethical life. 
According to this proposal, we should understand Williams to be saying that                       
shame and its structures can, under appropriate circumstances, ​help or ​contribute to                       
the development of a conception of one’s ethical identity, and can ​help or ​contribute                           
to mediating between ethical demands and the rest of life. These seem like                         
36 One might object that oppressive shame ​does provide a conception of one’s ​ethical identity ​because                               
the root of oppressive shame is ​not failing to conform to the standards set by dominant (oppressive)                                 
ideologies, as we have been assuming. Rather, the root of oppressive shame might be a certain kind                                 
of moral failing; perhaps one feels shame for being susceptible to this kind of shame and not having                                   
the strength, conviction, or courage to react by being indignant or resentful, or perhaps not reacting                               
at all, but dismissing the shaming act as morally problematic and oppressive. If this is the only                                 
content of all oppressive shame, then oppressive shame would be a second-order shame and more                             
importantly, a kind of shame that mediates between ethical demands and the rest of life. However,                               
for this argument to succeed, one would have to show that ​all cases of oppressive shame involve                                 
this kind of moral failing. In addition, this objection implies that there is a first-order shame to                                 
which oppressive shame is a second-order response. But this first-order shame is grounded in the                             
gaze of an internalized figure who represents—not ethical norms, but—the norms of oppressive                         
ideologies. Webster (unpublished) proposes a novel account of this kind of shame, focusing on                           
shame experience in response to (subtler cases of) racism. She claims that shame can be explained                               
by inability to choose when one’s stigmatized racialized identity is made salient where this is not a                                 
moral failing, but an inability caused by racism and oppression. 
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appropriate and plausible claims, given the loss-of-power conception of shame, for                     
the reasons we have explored. Because dimensions of power other than the ethical                         
can and do equally serve as the material for shame (including shame before a                           
respected, internalized other), shame alone cannot, at least for ordinary human                     
agents, pick out our ethical ​identities in particular, and cannot mediate between                       
ethical demands and the rest of life. Significant resources of some kind, in addition                           
to shame, are needed to achieve these ends. (What those resources might be is a                             
topic for another occasion.) 
So reinterpreted, Williams’ claims about shame and the ethical remain novel                       
and vital. For instance, the way that he develops the idea of the internalized figure                             
continues to raise a significant challenge to the claim that shame is somehow                         
essentially and problematically heteronomous. But at the same time, his account is                       
rendered significantly less ambitious in two ways: first, by giving up on the idea                           
that there is a ​distinctive connection of some kind between shame and the ethical,                           
one that was meant to be different from the connection between shame and                         
non-ethical systems of social expectations (like standards of physical attractiveness                   
or various oppressive ideologies); and second, by giving up on the related idea that                           
shame on its own would, in virtue of its special connection to the ethical, be able to                                 
fulfill certain distinctive key roles and functions in ethical life. 
6 Conclusion 
We have argued that, given the ambitious agenda that Williams sets for shame in                           
his conception of ethical life, he risks asking too much of shame. This is because                             
shame, as Williams himself conceives it, cannot play the leading role that he (at                           
least sometimes) seems to assign it in embodying our ethical identities and                       
mediating between ethical demands and the rest of life. The simple reason for this                           
is that shame concerns itself with much more than just the ethical, and so is not                               
well positioned to mediate between the ethical and other domains. For instance,                       
among other things shame can be and is used as a tool of power, and can embody                                 
and enforce relations that are asymmetrical, alienating, and divisive. An agent in                       
whom shame operates in these ways cannot rely on shame to give her a conception                             
of her ethical identity or to mediate between ethical demands and the rest of                           
life—she will instead need other resources in order to distinguish between shame’s                       
ethical and non-ethical workings. To think otherwise would appear to require the                       
assumption that shame somehow is naturally allied with the ethical or excludes the                         
non-ethical; but to make such an assumption would look very much like a                         
manifestation of the kind of moralizing tendency in psychology that Williams was                       
otherwise at great pains to denounce and avoid. For this reason, we feel that our                             
interpretive proposal is in tune with Williams’ larger concerns and commitments. 
There is also another reason to think that a more modest rehabilitation along                         
these lines actually best captures the spirit of the Williamsian view of shame. We                           
find it to be uncharacteristic of Williams to observe that “[i]n the scheme of                           
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Kantian oppositions, shame is on the bad side of all the lines,” and then to resist                               
this by advancing arguments to put shame back on the ​good side of all those lines.                               
The more characteristically Williamsian response, in our view—and the more                   
appropriate one in this instance—is to be unperturbed that shame should fall on                         
the bad side of all the Kantian lines, because ​those lines have not been drawn in the                                 
right places.  37
Perhaps this might lead one to worry that on our reading of Williams he leaves                             
shame “on the bad side of all the lines,” and thus does not actually rehabilitate                             
shame at all. This is too quick, however. Williams’ account retains rich materials                         
with which to understand shame as playing a constructive and even an important                         
role in ethical life. The difference that our preferred interpretation makes is that                         
this role will be a supporting and contingent one, rather than a central or                           
distinctive one. We are optimistic about this more modest sort of rehabilitation                       
that consists in showing how shame ​can​, in appropriate circumstances, become                     
attached to ethical values and so play an important if supporting role in revealing                           
our ethical identities and mediating between ethical and other demands. We have                       
tried to show that without taking undue license, Williams himself can be read as                           
offering a more modest rehabilitation of this kind.   38
There may also be a more general lesson to be drawn from this engagement                           
with Williams—though we can do no more than offer this as a suggestion here.                           
The more general lesson is that the persistent tendency among moral theorists to                         
seek to discover some kind of ​special ​affinity between shame and morality or the                           
ethical ​is to be regarded with suspicion. Moreover, we suspect that it has been a                           
mistake to suppose that shame is in need of “rehabilitation,” in this sense. Like                           
Williams, with his loss-of-power conception, we are inclined to see shame as a                         
quite basic and rudimentary emotional response that manifests in a wide variety of                         
contexts and embodies a wide variety of concerns—ranging from the ethical to the                         
merely personal to the quite superficial. We fail to see why shame is a more suitable                               
target for rehabilitation than other relatively basic emotions, or why we should                       
expect shame, more than other similarly basic emotions, to be able to play a central                             
role in embodying and revealing our ethical identities. That is, we think that there                           
is good reason to be satisfied with a more modest rehabilitation. 
   
37 Indeed, Williams adopts the more characteristic response elsewhere, observing: “It is precisely                         
what Kantians would call the heteronomy of shame (or rather its indeterminate degree of                           
heteronomy), taken together with its inherent impurity, which give it its ethical significance” (1997:                           
29). 
38 To be clear, Williams suggests that shame is thought to fall on the bad side of all the lines because                                         
its values are superficial, heteronomous, and egoistic. We agree that shame does not have any of                               
these characteristics predominantly or inherently; but we are equally skeptical of efforts to show                           
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